ABSTRACT Attribute-based encryption (ABE) mechanism on lattices can against quantum attack and guarantees fine-grained access control of encrypted data, and it has been widely used in cloud computing and privacy protection. However, the high complexity of the trapdoor generation and delegation and preimage sampling are the main barriers for the development of ABE schemes in a post-quantum world. Thus, we proposed a security and efficient multi-authority ABE scheme from lattices in this paper. The scheme is based on the theory of MP12 and is proved to be secure under the standard model. In this scheme, we construct an optimized sampling algorithm to generate a Z q -invertible matrix with a lower runtime. Based on it, combining the trapdoor generation and delegation algorithm in MP12, we designed multiple attribute authorities which can manage different attribute sets and generate private keys for the user independently. In addition, the Shamir's secret sharing technique is introduced to support policies expressed in any monotone access structures. Compared with the existing related schemes, the proposed scheme can improve the functional agility and the flexibility of the access policy prominently, and it also can achieve a better performance with less lattice dimension, trapdoor storage occupation, and ciphertext expansion rate. The analysis shows that our scheme is feasible and superior in the large-scale distributed environment.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of computers and cloud computing, traditional social networks begins to develop to the information-centric social networks (IC-SN) [1] . Large amounts of data are transmitted over the network. Especially people tend to stored and shared their data over the cloud sever. This will lead to some additional security and privacy concerns, especially since the users do not want their sensitive information to be completely transparent to the cloud server. And worst of all, once the cloud server is hacked, all the users' sensitive information will be leaked. In addition, when some visitors access a user's outsourced data, the cloud server needs to interact with data owner to allow or restrict the visitor's access ability and scope. Therefore, efficient one-tomany broadcast encryption and fine grained access control is the key technology used for security enforcement of information. Attribute-based encryption (ABE) [2] , a new public-key encryption technology, ties the user's identity with a series of attributes. The user's private key or ciphertext is defined according to the attribute set or access structure, so only when the attribute set and the access structure matched each other, can the user decrypt the message. After that, ABE is considered to be the better choice for information security in cloud computing [3] . Besides, it also can be used to encrypt the patient's health data in the Personal Health Record (PHR) system or the user's electricity consumption information in the smart grid.
Attribute-based encryption on lattices can against quantum attack and guarantees fine-grained access control of encrypted data in the public cloud storage, and it has been widely used in cloud computing and privacy protection. Since 1997 Ajtai and Dwork proposed the first public key cryptosystem whose security is based on the worst-case hardness of a lattice problem [4] . There have been many ABE schemes proposed since the learning with errors (LWE) was proved as hard as worst hardness lattice problem [5] . In 2012, Agrawal et al. [6] utilized the theory of lattice to construct a fuzzy identity-based encryption scheme. The LWE problem was used to construct a small universes ABE scheme and a large universes ABE scheme. Zhang et al. [7] also proposed a ciphertext policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) from lattices in the same year. It can support flexible threshold access policies on attributes. In 2013, Boyen [8] constructed a functional ABE scheme on lattices. The linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) technique was introduced to construct the access structure in a lattice-based ABE scheme. But due to the use of cascaded matrix, the size of user's privacy key and the ciphertext were too long, and the storage cost was higher. In 2014, Liu et al. [9] presented an ABE scheme with attribute hierarchy for lattices supported ''THRESHOLD'' operation in the standard model. It was a LWE-based scheme and secure against chosen plaintext attack under the standard model. But a single ''THRESHOLD'' operation would lead a low flexibility of the system. Zhao et al. [10] constructed an ABE scheme for circuits on lattices from LWE assumption. It was a key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) and supported the ''AND'' operation. Wang et al. [11] constructed a CP-ABE scheme on lattice, in which the ciphertext policy is achieved by the AND-gates on attributes.
All the above proposed schemes just set a single authority to manage all the user's attributes. Users may be stuck for a long time when they apply for their privacy key at the same time. Hence, in a large-scale cloud environment it would results in a single-point performance bottleneck and low efficiency. Besides, big data collection between different application platform becomes more and more frequent, such as the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) [12] . The scheme in which the attribute universe is assumed to be managed by a single authority is not apply this large scale distributed network. To solve this problem, Chase proposed the first multi-authority attribute-based encryption (MA-ABE) scheme in [13] . It consisted of multiple attribute authorities (AAs) and one central authority (CA). AAs monitor different universe of attributes and distribute secret keys for user. CA is responsible for generating public and secret keys for other AAs. However, it is very hard to resist collusion attacks. Because CA knows all the secret keys of any attribute authority, it can combine all the attribute private keys. Hence, Chase and Chow [14] proposed a privacy-preserving MA-ABE scheme which provides an anonymous credential to protect the user's global identifiers (GID). However, it is only supported an AND policy. Subsequently, Lin et al. [15] constructed a threshold MA-ABE scheme that can realize any access structure without a trusted CA. In the scheme, multiple authorities must work together to initialize the system during the system setup. It can resist collusion of users less than m, where m is a chosen parameter at setup phase. Müller et al. [16] proposed an ABE scheme that can realize any access structure but needs an authentication centre. Lewko and Waters [17] proposed a scheme for decentralized ABE scenario, in which the authorities work independently without coordination among them. It actually generalizes to handle any policy that can be expressed as a Linear Secret Sharing Scheme (LSSS) or equivalently a monotone span program. Rouselakis and Waters [18] proposed an efficient large-universe multi-authority ciphertextpolicy attribute-based encryption system (MA-CP-ABE). In the scheme, there are several authorities, each of which is responsible for the authorized key distribution of a specific set of attributes. Zhang et al. [19] propose an adaptively secure MA-ABE with verifiable outsourced decryption. They lighten the decryption cost for data users by outsourcing the complicated bilinear pairing computation to the clouds. In addition, some MA-ABE schemes also could directly applied to the public cloud storage [20] , [21] or cloud assisted IoT [22] .
However, all the above proposed MA-ABE schemes were based on the bilinear maps. The complex calculation of bilinear pairs on the group would lead to a high computation and storage cost, and the scheme can not resist quantum attacks. Therefore, in 2015, Zhang et al. [23] proposed the first MA-ABE scheme on lattice, in which there is a central authority (CA) and many attribute authorities that need to deal with large system attributes. In other words, the system public/privacy key is relative to system attributes, which can be a performance bottleneck in the system. Additionally, the scheme was only secure under the random oracle model and it supports only a single ''THRESHOLD'' operation, which would lead a low flexibility of the system. Liu et al. [24] constructed a multi-authority key-policy ABE (MA-KP-ABE) scheme from lattices. The scheme has the advantage of fine grained access control, and also can support multi-authority attribute management. In 2018, Yan et al. [25] proposed a MA-ABE scheme from LWE problem. They performed the basis delegation without dimension increase algorithm to construct the encryption scheme and the security proof. Fine-grained access control and the lower storage cost are the main advantages.
In summary, the previous ABE schemes on lattice generally yielded the user's secret key by using the trapdoor generation and preimage sampling function in [26] . But in either the trapdoor quality or the runtime, they are much more complex and not suitable for practice. (Here we say the trapdoor quality is the vectors Euclidean length, the shorter the better). Besides, most of the previous ABE schemes from lattice are studying one-credible-authority mechanism [6] - [9] , [17] , the efficiency and security is much lower than multi-authority system. In addition, they mostly support a single ''THRESHOLD'' operator or a single ''AND'' operator access structure [7] , [9] - [11] , [23] , so the flexibility was lower. Hence, it remains to find a solution which can achieve flexibility access policy in MA-ABE scheme from lattice and produce a strong trapdoor and reduce the runtime.
A. OUR CONTRIBUTION
In this paper, we presented a security and efficient MA-ABE scheme from lattices which is secure in the standard model, more efficient in communication cost and support any access policy. Based on the above depiction, the comparisons among previous MA-ABE schemes and our proposed scheme are listed in Table 1 and Table 2 .
We can see that our scheme has many excellent characteristics:
(1) Optimized SampleR algorithm. In our scheme, we make an improvement of the prior SampleR algorithm in [27] which was frequently performed in other scheme, such as in [25] . Combined the theory in MP12 [28] to generate a strong trapdoor, we construct an optimized sampling algorithm to generate a Z q -invertible matrix which is a vital procedure of the trapdoor delegation and SampleR with Trapdoor algorithm. The Z q -invertible matrix can be sampling from a discrete Gaussian in O(n log c n) time, rather than (n 2 log 2 n) time. The output quality s is approximately 1.6 √ n log q, instead of 20 √ n log q (The trapdoor quality is the vectors Euclidean length, the shorter the better). We give the description of our optimized SampleR algorithm in the subsection A of section IV. (2) Multi-Authority. In this paper, we designed multiple authorities to generate user's private key by their monitored attributes which resolves key escrow problem to some extent. The communication and computation cost of the user's privacy key is reduced by using of the trapdoor delegation mechanism and preimage sampling functions in MP12. (3) Flexibility access policy. Our scheme supports arbitrarily monotone access structure and achieves ''AND'', ''OR'' and ''THRESHOLD'' operations of attributes. In the scheme we define an access tree to specify access policy, instead of the traditional access policy in [6] - [9] , [11] , and [23] which only set a threshold value or matching attribute set. In an access tree structure, each interior node is represented by ''AND'', ''OR'' and ''THRESHOLD'' gate, and leaves are associated with attributes. With it, the message owner can specify flexible and expressive access policy with the Shamir's secret sharing technique to construct the ciphertext. Compared to the first MA-ABE scheme from lattices in [23] , our scheme support more flexibility access policies. (4) Better performance. Our scheme has a better system performance. From the performance analysis, it is shown that the lattices dimension m, the size of trapdoor, the size of system's public key, the size of master key, the size of user's secret key and the ciphertext expansion rate are much lower than the single authority schemes in [8] , [9] , and [11] and the multiple authorities schemes in [23] and [25] . We give the detailed performance analysis in section VI.
B. ORGANIZATION
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section II, we recall the basic definition of cryptographic primitives on lattice used in this paper. The definition and security model for our scheme are given in section III. In section IV, an optimized SampleR algorithm and a security and efficient MA-ABE scheme from lattices are proposed, and the related parameters setting are also given in this section. The proposed scheme is proved to be secure in section V. Subsequently, we give a performance analysis in section VI. Finally, we conclude this paper in section VII.
II. PRELIMINARISE A. NOTATION
As shown in Table 3 , the symbols which were used in this paper have defined in detail. The bold capital and lowercase letters denote respectively the matrices and vectors. And k is the number of attribute authorities. VOLUME 7, 2019 B. LATTICES Definition 1: Given n linearly independent vectors b 1 , b 2 , . . . , b n ∈ R m , and the lattices generated by the following formula:
is a basis of , and m is the dimension, n is the rank.
Definition 2: For prime q, A ∈ Z n×m q , and u ∈ Z n q , define:
Definition 3: For a vector c ∈ R m and a positive integer s ∈ R, we defined a Gaussian distribution with centre c and variance s as follow:
where σ > 0 is a parameter, and ρ σ,c (x) = exp(−π
D. ALGORITHMS IN MP12
Here we give some related algorithms in MP12. Be different from the Basis Delegation Without Dimension Increase algorithm in [27] , we denoted the algorithms in MP12 by MP12-TrapGen, MP12-SamplePre, MP12-DelTrap and MP12-SampleRwithTrap. Meanwhile, we will give an optimized SampleR algorithm in section IV.
For any integer q ≥ 2, n ≥ 1, w = nt, t = log 2 q , and sufficiently large m = O(log q), there has: with centre 0 and standard deviation α/2π .¯ α is the corresponding discrete distribution over Z q . Consider a prime q, a positive integer n, and a distribution¯ α over Z q . A (Z q , n,¯ α )-LWE problem instance consists of access to an unspecified challenge oracle O, being either a truly random sampler O s or a noisy pseudo-random sampler O s carrying some constant random secret key s ∈ Z q , whose behaviors are as follows respectively:
O s : Outputs samples of the form 
The (Z q , n,¯ α )-LWE problem allows a number of queries to the challenge oracle O.We say an algorithm A decides [5] : If there exists an efficient, possibly quantum, algorithm for deciding the (Z q , n,¯ α )-LWE problem for q > 2 √ n/α then there is an efficient quantum algorithm for approximating the SIVP and GapSVP problems to withinÕ(n/α) factors in the 2 norm, in the worst case. with all but negligible probability in m.
III. DEFINITION OF THE SCHEME AND SECURITY MODEL A. DEFINITION OF THE SYSTEM ALGORITHM
The scheme consists of the following four algorithms: (1) Setup(1 n ) → (PP, MK ): Taking as input a security parameter 1 n , the algorithm outputs the public parameter PP, and the master secret key MK . 
B. SECURITY MODEL
The semantic security against chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) is modeled in the selective attribute model (sAtt), in which the adversary must provide the attributes he wishes to attack before he receives the public parameters from the challenger. The game is carried out between a simulator B and an adversary A. The game is as follows: Initialization: The adversary A sends the challenge access tree τ * to the simulator B. The simulator B runs the Setup algorithm to generate the public parameter PP and the master key MK . Then B sends PP to A.
Phase 1: The adversary A makes many attribute privatekey queries and determines the attributes set does not appear in access tree τ * . The simulator B generates the privacy key SK A and sends it to A.
Challenge: The adversary A submits a message b * ∈ {0, 1} to B. The simulator B randomly chooses µ ∈ {0, 1}. If µ = 0, encrypts b * under the access tree τ * , and sends the ciphertext to A. Otherwise(i.e.,µ = 1), it chooses a random challenge ciphertext and sends it to A. Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated. Guess: A outputs his guess µ on µ. Definition 6: Our scheme is secure if any probably polynomial-time adversary A making some secret-key queries can win the above game with a negligible advantage
IV. SECURE AND EFFICIENT MULTI-AUTHORITY ATTRIBUTE-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEME FROM LATTICES A. OPTIMIZED SAMPLER ALGORITHM
In this section, we give an optimized SampleR algorithm(we call it OPSampleR) to generate a Z q -invertible matrix R ∈ Z m×m , since SampleR algorithm is an important component of the TrapDel and SampleRwithTrap which is used in our MA-ABE scheme and the security proof. As shown in [27] , in order to generate the vectors of R, the SampleR algorithm need to recall sample algorithm fewer than two times in expectation for prime q. It can be performed in at least quadratic (n 2 log 2 n) time [28] . This will lead to high time complexity. Thus we combine the high efficiently ideal in MP12 to construct the SampleR algorithm. The main algorithm is summarized in the following section:
Algorithm OPSampleR(1 m ): For any integer q ≥ 2, n ≥ 1, w = nt, t = log 2 q , and sufficiently large m = O(log q), oracle O G which sampling from a coset ⊥ (G), and the Gaussian parameter σ G ,do: (1) LetĀ ∈ Z n×m q be a uniformly random matrix and H ∈ Z n×n q denotes a invertible matrix. We construct a primitive and public matrix G = I n ⊗ g ∈ Z n×w q where I n is a n × n identity matrix and the vector g = (1, 2, 4 , . . . Step 1:
Step 2: Then compute r i = T A I r i ∈ Z m where I is a w × w identity matrix and m =m + w.
Step 3: Let R = (r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m ) ∈ Z m×m . If R is Z qinvertible, outputs R, otherwise repeat Step 1.
The sample algorithm in MP12 can be performed in O(n log c n) time [28] . Compared to it, our OPSampleR algorithm just only add the linear calculation in Step 2, the computation complexity is much lower than sample algorithm in [27] . Thus the OPSampleR algorithm is sampling from a discrete Gaussian can be performed in O(n log c n) time, rather than the traditional SampleR algorithm in [27] in (n 2 log 2 n) time. Besides, the output quality s is approximately 1.6 √ n log q, instead of 20 √ n log q.
B. OUR MA-ABE SCHEME FROM LATTICES
The symbols had defined in Table 3 in the part A of section II. Before the scheme operation, we assume that there are k attribute authorities, and each attribute authority monitored n i attributes. AA i (i = 1, .., .k) denotes the attribute authority, andÃ i = (a i,1 , a i,2 , . . . , a i,n i ) denotes the attribute set which monitors by AA i . Then construct a primitive and public matrix G = I n ⊗ g ∈ Z n×w q where I n is a n × n identity matrix and the vector g = (1, 2, 4 , . . . 2 t−1 ) ∈ Z t q . The algorithms of our k-authority ABE scheme are as follows:
Taking as input a security parameter 1 n , the algorithm outputs the public parameter PP and the master secret key MK . The system firstly runs MP12-TrapGen(Ā, H) algorithm (Lemma 2) k times for each attribute authority to generate a uniformly random matrix
, and the T A i ∈ Zm ×w q is the trapdoor matrix where m =m + w. Then it chooses a uniformly random vector u = (u 1 , u 2 , . . . , u n ) ∈ Z n q . Now, set the public parameter PP and the master secret key MK as: 
to generate a trapdoor matrix
Step 4: The attribute authority performs MP12-Sample Pre(A i , G, T B i,j , u i , σ i,j ) to obtain e i,j ∈ Zm +w q = Z m q . In addition, notice that we have B i,j e i,j = u i . Thus, the user's privacy key
This algorithm is run by the user. Taking as input the public parameter PP, the message b, and the access tree τ , it outputs the ciphertext C.
Step 1: The Shamir's secret sharing technique is introduced to construct the access tree. The user chooses s = (s 1 , s 2 , . . . , s n ) ∈ Z n q randomly, sets s be the value of the root node, and marks the root node assigned. For each un-assigned non-leaf node, do:
-If the operator is ∨ (OR operator), and its child nodes are marked un-assigned, then set the value of its child node be s. Mark this node assigned. -If the operator is ∧ (AND operator), and its child nodes are marked un-assigned, then chooses s l ∈ Z n q (l = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1) randomly, where n is the number of its child node. Then set the value of the n'th child node be s n = s − n−1 l=1 s l ∈ Z n q . Mark this node assigned.
-If the symbol is of (THRESHOLD operator), and its child nodes are marked un-assigned, then the secret s is divided using (t, n) Shamir's secret sharing technique. Each child node obtains a share vector s l = (s 1,l , s 2,l , . . . , s n,l ) ∈ Z n q . Mark this node assigned.
Step 2: Choose noise terms x¯ 2 where k is the number of the attribute authorities and d is the maximum number of the attributes inÃ i . Compute:
For each attribute a (l) i,j ∈ τ where l denotes the index of attribute in τ , compute:
Thus, the ciphertext
This algorithm inputs the public parameter PP, the user's privacy key SK u , and the ciphertext C. Set the Guassian parameterσ i,j = σ i,j √ mω( √ log m). If A u does not satisfy τ , return ⊥, otherwise this algorithm chooses the smallest set A u ⊆ A u that satisfies τ and do the following,
Step 2:
Step 3: If |b − q/2 | < q/4 , output 1. Otherwise, output 0.
C. PARAMETERS AND CORRECTNESS
To decrypted the ciphertext, we have
It is suffices to set the parameters so that with overwhelming probability(w.h.p)
For the first inequality, we use the Lemma 7 proposed in [6] on Lagrangian coefficients which states that the numbers KL i L l are integers bounded above by
h.p, we have by Lemma 6 that the |e i,j x i,j | is bounded w.h.p by
Thus, the error term
where we use the fact (k!) 2 ≤ (k) 2k . For the MP12-TrapGen can operate, we need m ≈ 2n log q. To ensure the correctness, the error term in ''(9)'' is less than q/5 w.h.p, it set
For the MP12-TrapDel can operate, the Gram-Schmidt norm of a short basis satisfies
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
Theorem 2: Our scheme is secure under the selectiveattribute and chosen-plaintext attack (sAtt-CPA) game if the decisional (Z q , n,¯ α )-LWE problem holds.
Proof: Suppose A is a PPT adversary that can attack our security and efficient MA-ABE scheme from lattices in the selective-attribute secure game with advantage ε > 0. Then there exists a PPT algorithm B can decide the (Z q , n,¯ α )-LWE problem with advantage ε/(
and k i denotes the size of the challenge attribute set to the ith authority on the challenge access tree τ * .
Recall from Definition 4 that the (Z q , n,¯ α )-LWE problem need to distinguish the sampler O is a truly random sampler O s or a noisy pseudo-random sampler O s . The secure game is as follows:
Initialization: (1) The adversary A sends the challenge access tree τ * to the simulator B. Let A τ * = (A 1 τ * , . . . A k τ * ) denote the attribute set to each authority in the access tree. For each authority, assuming |A i τ * | = k i .
(2) The simulator B requests from O to obtains m k i=1 k i + 1 LWE samples that we denote as
Let u = ω 1 . Then B generated the system public parameter as follows: (3) For each attribute a i,j ∈ A τ * , Construct (12) from the
Then the simulator B executes OPSampleR algorithm to generate
∈ A τ * , the simulator B firstly runs the MP12-TrapGen algorithm to generated the other matrices A i,j , (j = k i + 1, . . . , n i ). Then B executes OPSampleR algorithm to generate a Z q -invertible matrix R * i,j ∈ Z m×m from a distribution that is statistically close to D m×m . Compute
Lastly it executes MP12-SampleRwithTrap(A i,j ) algorithm to generate a random matrix R i,j ∈ Z m×m and a trapdoor T B * i,j 
. (15) Then the ciphertext
The simulator B outputs the ciphertext C * = {c * 0 , c * i,j } and sends it to the adversary A.
It is obviously that when
and then the ciphertext C * is uniform in (Z q × Z m q ). Phase 2: Phase 1 is repeated. Guess: The simulator B receives a guess µ for µ from A, and outputs µ as the answer to the LWE challenge.
Since there are 
VI. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
Here we give the comparison between some related schemes. At present, the ABE schemes based on the lattice are not mature enough. Most schemes only support a single authority to monitor all the attributes and distribute the privacy keys for the users. It would lead to a big pressure and delay reaction when there are multiple users apply for the privacy keys at the same time. Besides, most of the schemes are based on the algorithms in [26] whose lattice dimension is m ≥ 5n log q. However, lattice dimension in our scheme is reduced to m ≈ 2n log q. Thus the storage cost would be smaller than the others. In addition, a smaller and better trapdoor is produced to instead of the original one-a basis whose storage cost is least four times smaller than the basis trapdoor. As shown in Table 4 , we compare our algorithm OPSamleR which is introduced in the section IV with the previous one in [27] . Since SampleR is an important component of the algorithms MP12-DelTrap and MP12-SampleRwithTrap which are used in our MA-ABE scheme and the security proof. The efficiency to generate a Z q -invertible matrix R ∈ Z m×m is directly impact the system's performance. We can see that our OPSamleR algorithm is sampling from a discrete Gaussian can be performed in O(n log c n) time, rather than the traditional SampleR algorithm in [27] in (n 2 log 2 n) time. The output quality s is approximately 1.6 √ n log q, instead of 20 √ n log q. In addition, as shown in Table 5 , we compare our scheme with the previous schemes in [8] , [9] , [11] , [23] , and [25] in terms of security model, system function and communication cost.The function includes whether it supports multiple authorities and supported operations. The communication cost refers to the lattice dimension, the trapdoor size, the PP size, SK u size, and the expansion rate of the ciphertext. We denote the standard model as SM, and the random oracle model as RO. s denotes the number of attributes of the system. k is the number of attribute authorities of the system. d is the maximum deep for all attribute. A u is the number of user's attributes. A c is the number of attributes encrypted by the user. The expansion rate of ciphertext is the ratio of plaintext to ciphertext.
To facilitate observation, we quantify all the parameter here. Let modulus algorithm log 2 q = 24 and n = 284 which had set in [28] . s = 100, k = 10, d = 2, A u = 20, and A c = 20. The detailed results after quantization are shown in Table 6 .
From Table 5 , we can see that the schemes in [8] , [9] , and [11] can't support the multi-authority, our scheme and the scheme in [23] and [25] support complex environment with multi-authority. But it is obvious that the scheme of [23] is only proved to be secure under the random oracle model while our scheme and the scheme in [25] is secure under the standard model. Besides, the use of operators is not considered in the schemes in [9] , [11] , and [23] , and the decryption operation is accomplished only by a single match of the user attribute and the list of ciphertext attributes. It would lead to a low flexibility. Our scheme and the scheme in [8] and [25] can support ''AND'' ''OR'' and ''THRESHOLD'' operations of attributes with a high flexibility. However, the linear secret sharing scheme (LSSS) technique is introduced to construct the access structure in the scheme [8] , and the sharing matrix in the LSSS did not elaborate how to express the access control policy. It supports the ''AND'' ''OR'' and ''THRESHOLD'' operations only under the standard assumption. In our scheme, the access structure is expressed by a monotone access tree which is constructed by Shamir's secret sharing technique. The complexity of construction is reduced and the flexibility and the security of the system are improved.
The complexity comparison of communication cost is represented by the lattice dimension, the trapdoor size, the PP size, MK size, SK u size and the expansion rate of the ciphertext. As shown in Table 4 and Table 5 , it is obvious that the lattice dimension and the trapdoor size are much smaller than the others. The PP size and MK size in the scheme of [8] , [9] , [11] , and [23] are relatively long. Because they are not only linearly related to the total number of attributes in the system, but also related to the parameter of the lattice. It would lead to a high storage cost. Although the PP size and MK size in the scheme of [25] are related to the number of attribute authorities and the lattice parameter, but our scheme is lower than the scheme of [25] on account of the fact that the lattice parameter in our scheme is slightly smaller. In the aspect of SK u size and the expansion rate of ciphertext, our scheme is also superior to others. The primarily reason lies in the fact that in the scheme of [8] and [9] , they yield the SampleLeft algorithm of a cascaded matrix, the SK u and ciphertext size are related to the number of the cascaded matrix columns and the number of user's attributes. And in the scheme of [9] , the idea of attribute hierarchy leads to the fact that the SK u and ciphertext size are not only related to the number of columns and the number of user's attributes, but also to the depth of the attribute hierarchy. But in our scheme, it is only related to the columns of the matrix and the number of the user's or the ciphertext attributes. As a whole, we have optimized the scheme in terms of both the storage and computational costs.
Based on the comprehensive analysis, by introduced the ideal of MP12, we construct an optimized SampleR algorithm which has an efficiently performance and lower runtime.
Moreover, our efficient MA-ABE scheme from lattices supports multiple authorities to monitor different attribute sets and distribute privacy key for the user. The security can be reduced to the hardness problem of learning with errors under the standard model and the flexibility operations make it more applicable to the distributed storage environment.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we constructed a security and efficient multiauthority attribute-based encryption scheme based on the hardness of LWE. The scheme was proved to be secure under the standard model. There are multiple authorities which can manage different attribute sets and generate privacy keys for the users by executing the our optimized trapdoor delegation algorithm. Thus the size of user's privacy and ciphertext were reduced. In addition, the Shamir's secret sharing technique was introduced to express a monotone access tree structure which can support ''AND'' ''OR'' and ''THRESHOLD'' operations of attributes with a high flexibility. In future, it is interesting to enhance our LWE-based MA-ABE scheme with a more complex access policy such as non-monotone access structure. 
